Conclusions
Astute observers may note that “the issues” have barely featured in this text. The reason for this is simple and recalls the introduction to this analysis. The BiH mainstream political arena is increasingly unresponsive to prevailing social realities, arguably more so than ever before. The issues, as such, have been little discussed in this election. Corruption is endemic, unemployment staggering, the poverty rate crippling. Yet despite this voters are left with few choices. There is hardly a new face in the bunch, at least a plausibly electable one, despite nearly 8,000 candidates. Across BiH, young and old alike will tell you that the thought of voting for the same old band of thieves, in turn, is enough to steer them clear of the ballot box altogether.
Yes, smaller, more program-oriented parties like that Naša stranka (Our Party) exist in BiH but their success has been limited to a smattering of cantonal seats, with little state-level power. All politics is indeed local, municipal initiatives for instance, as one recent constitutional reform project argued, could be the basis for a more sensibly organized state structure. But there may be precious little patience left for this kind of tinkering.
In the wake of the February protests, there is a growing sentiment in BiH that the solution to the country’s endemic stagnation will not be found within the political class but outside of it—in the streets. In Argentina, at the time of 2001 financial collapse, they summed this sentiment up as “¡Que se vayan todos!”—all of them must go.
Whoever forms the next set of BiH government(s) will have to convince an increasingly frustrated and militant population that reform is coming. Time, however, will not be on their side. If February was a short-lived Bosnian Spring, October may bring the beginning of a furious Bosnian Winter.
